

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT**

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-NINTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 4 August 1966, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. V. C. TRIVEDI

(India)

THE UNIVERSITY
OF MICHIGAN

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PRESENT AT THE TABLE

<u>Brazil:</u>	Mr. A. F. AZEREDO da SILVEIRA Mr. A. da COSTA GUIMARAES Mr. C. H. PAULINO PRATES
<u>Bulgaria:</u>	Mr. B. KONSTANTINOV Mr. D. POPOV Mr. T. DAMIANOV
<u>Burma:</u>	U MAUNG MAUNG GYI
<u>Canada:</u>	Mr. E. L. M. BURNS Mr. C. J. MARSHALL Mr. P. D. LEE
<u>Czechoslovakia:</u>	Mr. T. LAHODA Mr. V. VAJNAR
<u>Ethiopia:</u>	Mr. A. ABERRA Mr. A. ZELLEKE
<u>India:</u>	Mr. V. C. TRIVEDI Mr. K. P. JAIN
<u>Italy:</u>	Mr. F. CAVALLETTI Mr. G. P. TOZZOLI Mr. S. AVETTA Mr. F. SORO
<u>Mexico:</u>	Mr. A. GOMEZ ROBLEDO Mr. M. TELLO MACIAS
<u>Nigeria:</u>	Mr. G. O. IJEWERE Mr. M. B. BRIMAH
<u>Poland:</u>	Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN Mr. E. STANIEWSKI Mr. B. KAJDY

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Romania:

Mr. V. DUMITRESCU

Mr. E. GLASER

Mr. C. UNGUREANU

Mr. A. COROIANU

Sweden:

Mrs. A. MYRDAL

Mr. H. BLIX

Mr. P. HAMMARSKJOLD

Mr. R. BOMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. A. A. ROSHCHIN

Mr. I. I. CHEPROV

Mr. M. P. SHELEPIN

Mr. V. B. TOULINOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. H. KHALIL

Mr. A. OSMAN

Mr. A. A. SALAM

United Kingdom:

Lord CHALFONT

Sir Harold BEELEY

Miss E. J. M. RICHARDSON

United States of America:

Mr. A. S. FISHER

Mr. L. WEILER

Mr. C. G. BREAM

Mr. A. NEIDLE

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (India): I declare open the two hundred and seventy-ninth plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Before I call upon the first speaker, I should like to welcome back to the Committee Mr. Lahoda, the representative of Czechoslovakia. We hope to profit by his collaboration.

Mrs. MYRDAL (Sweden): On the issue of a treaty banning the spread of nuclear weapons to further countries, which has occupied most of our precious time this session, the Swedish delegation has been sparing of comments.

The representative of the United Kingdom, Lord Chalfont, in his statement on 16 June, urged the non-aligned delegations in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee "to take a more active part in trying to settle the difficulties which the nuclear States have run into over articles I and II" (ENDC/PV.265, p.11). I doubt, however, that that would be a wise course of action. All members of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee are now aware that on that subject, and not least in reference to those very articles, we are in reality engaged in two different dialogues. It has become routine for us now to label the first one "non-dissemination", that is, the transfer of nuclear weapons, directly or indirectly, to States or groups of States. This subject definitely falls within the field of competence of the Powers which possess nuclear weapons, and it is also of direct interest to their allies. Countries like mine cannot, however, usefully intervene on this issue, which is intensely discussed within, and hotly disputed between, the military alliances; although, of course, as individual countries we are not unconcerned about the developments destined for our various regions.

The situation is quite different in regard to the twin proposal for "non-prolifer" "non-proliferation" in the narrower sense: that is, closing the possibilities for hitherto non-nuclear-weapon States to embark on the manufacture of such weapons. To that dialogue the non-aligned countries are very essential parties. They have evolved by collective and individual efforts what now amounts to a consistent structure of thought, which has also made its imprint on United Nations resolution 2028 (XX) (ENDC/161), under the terms of reference of which our work proceeds. The Swedish delegation has repeatedly presented its views. I feel obliged, however, to reiterate the considered opinion that, inasmuch as the purpose of our negotiations is to forestall that kind of proliferation of nuclear devices, we have at our disposal two collateral measures which would be incomparably more efficacious for achieving that goal than a formal treaty as proposed, embodying political pledges. I am, of course, referring to a comprehensive ban on the testing of nuclear weapons, and a cutting off of production of fissionable material for weapon purposes.

(Mrs. Myrdal, Sweden)

An account of our stand has recently been authoritatively rendered by the Swedish Government in Parliament, in its declaration of foreign policy on 23 March. It was quoted rather fully by Mr. Trivedi, but I would take the liberty of repeating it in somewhat briefer form:

"As to the Swedish point of view, we are positive to the efforts to bring about an effective agreement against further proliferation of nuclear weapons. Such an agreement presupposes universal accession attainable only through 'an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers', to use the wording of the United Nations resolution. Therefore Sweden supports in Geneva the demands of the non-aligned nations that the great Powers shall give their contribution in the form of a complete test ban and the discontinuance of the production of fissionable material for weapon purposes.

"When we set these demands we do not mean, of course, that we shall start production of nuclear weapons if our demands are not fulfilled. Such a decision has no political actuality in this country. When we insist on commitments in return, this is due to the fact that we want an agreement which constitutes an efficient contribution to the limitation of the nuclear threat ...".
(ENDC/PV.263, pp. 6, 7)

I should like to present some comments today on the collateral measure of a comprehensive test ban, and at a forthcoming meeting on that of a cutting-off of the production of fissionable material for weapon purposes. In doing so, I am prompted in the first instance by our strong conviction that those are highly effective methods of achieving non-proliferation. It has seemed to my Government, as expressed inter alia in the declaration just referred to, that the super-Powers have not yet given sufficient attention to the possibility of employing those very direct methods of achieving non-proliferation. It would mean, to speak bluntly, tying the hands not only of themselves but of the more than 100 nations that would in all probability sign such treaties as they signed the Moscow one. Should we not have a realistic calculus of the pros and cons, in terms of technical feasibility and political acceptability, as regards the various methods of effectively preventing the prospect that the five might become the fifteen or more, a spectre which President Kennedy and others have so eloquently evoked?

(Mrs. Myrdal, Sweden)

In fact, in the conditions of a combined test ban and cut-off a country contemplating withdrawing from the agreements and "going nuclear" would face the need of several years of research, testing and stockpiling of nuclear materials before its ambitions could be materialized. Under a plain non-proliferation accord, on the other hand, preparations might be made in advance, and, indeed, underground tests carried out and fissile material stockpiled, which would allow a rapid change from non-nuclear to nuclear-weapon status following a withdrawal announcement.

In any such realistic calculus of the pros and cons of various measures or some combination of measures, great weight must undoubtedly be given to an agreement banning all nuclear tests -- hence also underground ones, which are continuing at a rate which worries the international community. The concern of the international community has been voiced by several delegations in this hall, most recently by the representative of Burma at our meeting of 28 July (ENDC/PV.277). So far no signals have been emitted by the great Powers indicating that they are now ready to agree on the terms of such a test ban. Yet I feel inclined today to express a certain optimism, as I believe that agreement might be within reach. This belief is founded first and foremost on the not uncommon experience in history that when an action is so obviously timely and so close to maturity it becomes harder to withhold a decision to act.

What are the signs of such timeliness, of such a shortening of the maturing process in regard to a comprehensive test ban? The timeliness is dictated by the plain imperative of having some results to report soon from the long labours of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. The diagnosis of a special degree of ripeness precisely for that collateral measure which calls for a supplementary ban on underground nuclear testing depends, first, on the obvious fact that the world community demands it, and secondly on some observations we have tentatively made concerning the attitudes of the major parties, that is, the super-Powers. On both sides, it seems to me, there is an increasing understanding that a test ban may never be so watertight that it does not contain a certain margin of risk, but also an understanding that the risk is fairly insignificant.

The arguments about "risks" obviously centre on the subject of verification. On one side, the Soviet Union and the socialist States, when arguing for reliance solely on national means of verification, cautiously refrain from claiming for those means any

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100 per cent reliability in the technical sense; they state that those means are "sufficient" or "adequate" -- those are the terms used -- which, after all, also entails a political judgement. Thus it was most recently expressed in the statement of the representative of Bulgaria on 5 July: "that national means of detecting and identifying underground nuclear explosions are fully adequate to guarantee the observance of a future treaty" (ENDC/PV.270, p.3.).

On the other side, the United States is obviously moving towards verification requirements which are considerably less exacting than those advanced in the past. Such an impression of a general kind stems from the fact that, although demands for inspections in loco are not abandoned, no commitment to a specified number has been expressed recently. More particularly, I may refer to the description given on 4 April (ENDC/PV.254, pp. 16 et seq.) by the representative of the United States, Mr. Fisher, of what on-site inspections would involve physically. The methods to be employed seem to be considerably simplified as compared to those proposed earlier -- for instance at our 113th meeting, three years ago. The reason for the change in the United States position, we understand, is the outcome of a successful research programme. From the results of such scientific efforts all of us will of course benefit.

In this connexion I might perhaps be allowed to ask for clarification of a point which was not fully explained: namely, what accuracy can be expected in epicentre determinations. Mr. Fisher said: "If a particular unidentified seismic event were selected for inspection the area to be inspected would have to be determined by the analysis of the seismic data" (ibid., p.21). It seems essential to our deliberations that we should know exactly the present state of the art as regards the possibility of determining by such an analysis a reasonably small area which is sure to include the epicentre selected for inspection, so that inspectors would go to the right place and country.

This problem is obviously of general importance when we are negotiating a test-ban agreement. It also has special importance because of the way it applies to the most significant earthquake region which we have to consider: the North Pacific seismic belt, including the Aleutians and the Kurile Islands. In archipelago and coastal regions, a bias in the epicentre location could cause an event on land to be classified wrongly as

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an event in the sea and thus by definition as an earthquake. That is because, as the United States representative, Mr. Foster, told us on 2 September 1965, "the finding that the location of the geographical point of origin of the event was in water" (ENDC/PV.229, p.23) would be among the identification criteria for earthquakes. Conversely, an earthquake in a sea area might attract an on-site inspection to an innocent nearby island or other piece of land.

If such a bias as I have just mentioned were to occur, it would not only upset the analysis of events in general and decrease the yield of on-site inspections; it would also confuse the estimate of the number of suspicious events in this important area and by that the total number of such events. However, at the same meeting Mr. Foster also gave the encouraging information that a research programme was under way to improve the means for determination of location (ibid., p.22). It would involve sea-bottom seismometers and a nuclear explosion -- Project Long Shot, fired on Amchitka Island on 29 October last year.

The results of those efforts will of course be of central interest to us for assessment of the capability of on-site inspections and of their value as a complement to seismological surveillance. Therefore it seems to me that this Committee would appreciate being informed of the results of those recent and very interesting investigations, as well as, of course, others bearing on the intricate issue of verification of underground testing.

Test-ban negotiations certainly have a long history; and it is only natural that we should now be able to perceive a rather clear-cut pattern of diminishing demands concerning the verification procedure, making it legitimate to extrapolate the trends and thus presage a happy ending. We have only to recall how a few years ago a gigantic control machinery was foreseen for verifying nuclear tests, consisting of some 180 manned control stations, an international commission and permanent flying squads of inspectors, demanding tens of thousands of technical personnel and financial allocations in the billion-dollar category. At that time the requirement was for obtaining conclusive evidence, legally established by an international commission acting as a court. Today we are clearly content to rely on circumstantial evidence and on various empirical indications and probability considerations.

Without making any pretension that indirect, external methods of verification, using national means such as teleseismic detection, will ever achieve objective truth of 100

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per cent accuracy, my country for one will try to contribute towards improvements of such mechanical systems of monitoring, as free as possible from mere assessments which might be politically conditioned.

In this connexion I want to express our appreciation of the fact that so many delegations -- really too many to warrant enumeration by specific references -- have shown interest in, and thus encouraged, the preparatory work in which we have been engaged concerning the plans for an extended exchange of seismological data mentioned in my intervention of 10 March (ENDC/PV.247, p.16). As is well known, those plans have further developed since then. To begin with, a conference of eight interested States was held in Stockholm at the end of May, where a number of the technical problems involved in such an exchange were discussed and clarified. The Swedish Government is continuing, through bilateral contacts, to explore the possibilities of realizing the seismological co-operation envisaged. At the present stage of these contacts it would be premature to state what should be the next step in this endeavour. We shall, however, not fail to keep the members of this Committee informed, as appropriate.

Also in regard to another suggestion which my delegation has presented in some detail, namely, a system of "verification by challenge", I have to voice my gratitude for comments and encouraging support. Perhaps the expression "challenge" has tended to dramatize the method more than is warranted. I described in my earlier statements (ENDC/PV.247, 256) the hypothetical procedure, as I saw it, leading up gradually to a critical case where a violation seemed probably to have occurred. Only in such severe cases would parties advance "accusations". In the more likely but still, it is hoped, relatively few instances in which a party could not by any means at its disposal conclude that an event was natural, it would of course resort to friendly enquiries and expect reassuring information. An "invitation to inspection" might be forthcoming anywhere along the line of exchanges of views, spontaneously in some cases and under milder or stronger pressure in more severe cases of doubt. We have a right to hope, it seems to me, that governments parties to a test-ban treaty would use the instrument of "challenge", and particularly its sharpened edge of formal allegation, in such a responsible way that there need be no fear that it might engender mistrust, which was mentioned as a possible outcome by Mr. Fisher on 4 April (ENDC/PV.254, p.20). The system of "challenge" does not seem to differ in that respect from other methods to improve verification.

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The idea no doubt needs further elaboration and, not least, examination in relation to varying formulations of a treaty or to different situations. The "challenge", as we have seen it so far, and particularly the special consequences of a rejection of a bid for clarification, have rather definitely been tied to the existence of a treaty and, more especially, to the existence of a rather rigid withdrawal clause. A special question is how it could be made to work if a simple suspension of underground testing or an agreed "moratorium" were brought about.

What is important, of course, is that a treaty banning all tests, and preferably a treaty applying to all nations, would have the maximum effect in fostering the trust and confidence so sorely needed among nations. Also, a treaty prohibiting underground nuclear testing, signed and ratified by a great number of States, would serve as that bulwark against proliferation of nuclear weapons to additional countries which we are so urgently seeking in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

In the light of all the reasons I have summarized here today, my conclusion can be only one: now is the time to join hands to secure an agreement on a comprehensive test ban. However, to be practical, we also have to recognize certain difficulties which may constitute drags on immediate progress, particularly in view of the short time remaining for work in the Eighteen-Nation Committee. First, initial agreement by the super-Powers is essential. Next, it may have to be admitted that changing the arrangements they have made in regard to current testing programmes would require some time.

My suggestion is therefore that at this session of the Eighteen-Nation Committee we might have to be satisfied with obtaining their agreement to start active, detailed negotiations on such a treaty in the near future. However, that should mean in the very near future. We should first wish to be certain that their scientific and legal advisers in the respective capitals are set to work on treaty details as a kind of "contingency" planning for alternative solutions, using fully the autumn months, unhampered by the fact that the United Nations is then in session. So close to convergence are the positions of the super-Powers that we should then be able to expect at the end of the year a declaration of agreement in principle -- to be specific, agreement in principle on the crucial problem of verification. That would, I take it, by the nature of things signify a target date also for the end of testing. It would

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at the same time be an invitation to all other countries to follow suit. In the new year we in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee could then set about negotiating the details of the treaty.

Of course, the large majority of nations find it difficult to understand why the United Nations request for cessation of all tests by 1 January 1963, as set out in resolution 1762 (XVII), has not been heeded long ago by the nuclear-weapon countries. Many may regard my suggestion that we expect an agreement to be clinched by 1 January 1967 as permitting an overly generous "period of grace". However, we are persistent in urging a definitive full-stop to nuclear testing, aimed as it is at the development of more and more sophisticated weapons for purposes of mass destruction.

Lord CHALFONT (United Kingdom): Let me begin by thanking Mrs. Myrdal on my own behalf and on behalf of my delegation for her most interesting contribution to our discussions this morning. I cannot, of course, agree entirely with her when she states her priorities in regard to a non-proliferation treaty and a comprehensive test ban; but, in spite of that, every word of what she has said deserves close attention by all of us and, I suggest, especially by the three nuclear-weapon Powers represented here.

I should like today to say a few words on the subject of a comprehensive test ban, which I think everyone will agree is one of the most important collateral measures before us.

The positions taken by the two alliances are well known; they were referred to again by Mrs. Myrdal this morning. The Soviet Union and its allies maintain that under a comprehensive test ban national means of verification would be adequate to deal with all suspicious seismic events. The United States and its allies find that, in spite of the improvements in seismographic techniques, it is not yet possible by using national means of detection alone to be completely certain that a treaty is being observed by all parties. The recent paper by the United Kingdom Atomic Weapons Research Establishment, of which copies were circulated to members of the Conference, supports that estimate of the position; and, in the light of Mrs. Myrdal's remarks this morning, I might specifically draw the attention of the Committee to the sections of that report that deal with epicentral location at teleseismic ranges. So far the Soviet Union has not been prepared to offer any scientific evidence to support its contention that national means are sufficient; nor has it been prepared to comment on the scientific evidence made available by the West. Neither side has so far been prepared to alter its position over this matter of the right of inspection.

(Lord Chalfont, United Kingdom)

It is true, as the representative of Burma pointed out in his most interesting speech on 28 July, that the root of the difficulty lies in mutual suspicion on the part of the members of each alliance: on the one side, suspicion that inspections would serve as a cover for espionage and, on the other, suspicion that the treaty might be secretly broken if there were no provision for inspection (ENDC/PV.277, p.11). I must say I find it difficult to understand how a small number of inspections of the order which has been discussed in these deliberations -- seven at the very most -- could conceivably affect the security of a nation as powerful as the Soviet Union, especially as we in the West would be prepared to organize the inspections in such a way that espionage would be virtually impossible. On the other hand, if the Soviet Union is correct in its insistence that even such a small number of inspections is unnecessary, then it has a valid point. However, we are still waiting for firm evidence that that assumption is correct.

In this situation of scientific uncertainty and, it must be acknowledged, of continuing lack of mutual confidence, it is of the greatest importance to work out a treaty which each party can be confident is being observed by all the others. I should like to quote something the representative of the United States, Mr. Foster, said on 7 July:

"We do not ask for inspection for the sake of inspection. We ask for verification because we believe it essential to our security that, having concluded a treaty, we have confidence that any potential adversary is observing faithfully the same solemn undertakings affecting the development of new nuclear weapon systems as those we ourselves observe; and we would offer any potential adversary equal opportunity to verify our observance of those undertakings." (ENDC/PV.271, p.26)

That contention of Mr. Foster's is underlined and borne out by the fact that the Western Powers were prepared to sign a treaty without on-site inspection, banning tests in all environments where such inspections were clearly unnecessary for effective verification.

This problem has defied solution for several years, and the official positions of the two main protagonists have not changed. That, I fear, is true of many other suggested measures of arms control and disarmament. But I am all the more encouraged that it is in this field that serious efforts have been made recently, particularly by a number of non-aligned delegations, to find a way round the difficulty. Apart

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from intensified research by some of the nuclear Powers to improve their seismographic techniques, there has been the praiseworthy initiative of the Swedish Government -- mentioned again by Mrs. Myrdal in her statement this morning -- for a pooling of resources in the field of seismography by forming a "detection club" for the exchange of scientific data. I am extremely glad to hear from Mrs. Myrdal this morning that those efforts are continuing.

There have also been a number of extremely interesting suggestions, again by Sweden (ENDC/154; PV.247, 256) and also by the United Arab Republic (ENDC/PV.259), Mexico (ENDC/PV.248) and Burma (ENDC/PV.277), dealing with the possibilities of devising a formula for a treaty in which adequate verification could be provided by some sort of dialogue between a government on whose territory a doubtful seismic event had occurred and another government seeking reassurance that no breach of a comprehensive test-ban treaty had taken place. If other methods of reassurance failed, an on-site inspection might still be needed.

At a non-governmental symposium held recently in Scarborough, near Toronto, Canada, which several members of this Committee, including myself, attended in an unofficial capacity, a scheme on similar lines was discussed -- I expect it is familiar to many representatives at this table -- and attracted general support among the participants of the various nations at that symposium. The idea involved a ban on all tests for a trial period, combined with the possibility of verification by invitation.

The representative of Sweden, in her speech on 10 March (ENDC/PV.247), has already outlined a series of steps which such a procedure might involve. However, that is not, of course, the only way in which the matter might be dealt with. One can visualize a variety of different courses which might be taken, depending on the nature of the particular circumstances, the political conditions prevailing at the time, and so on. The process would generally begin with the detection of a doubtful seismic event or series of events. The detection might be made either by national or by international means, supposing that some type of international system had been successfully set up.

The government of the country in which the event had taken place would also undoubtedly be aware of it. It might then be that that government would without more ado volunteer information about it to other interested governments -- and indeed to an

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international body, if such a body existed. If the government concerned did not volunteer information, it would be open to any interested party to draw the attention of the government in whose territory the event had occurred to the fact that it had detected it, and to ask whether evidence was available to show that the event was not a nuclear test. Whoever took the initiative, the government concerned would be free to offer any evidence it liked in order to dispel the doubts of the party which had inquired about the event. It could also take other action to the same end: for instance, by inviting observers, whether representatives of the other party or not, to visit the scene of the event; it might even do so by questioning the nature of the evidence causing the original doubts.

In short, a dialogue -- as has already been suggested -- would develop, perhaps bilateral, perhaps multilateral, tending either towards the satisfaction of the party concerned that no nuclear test had taken place or to the reverse. One can envisage the dialogue being pursued, depending on the circumstances, either in public or in private. In many cases a private dialogue would be more conducive to the mutual satisfaction of the two parties; but in some cases it might be that public knowledge of the dialogue and public opinion itself would be necessarily and usefully involved. Supposing that mutual satisfaction were reached, that would be the end of the matter, whether or not it had become publicly known.

If, however, the evidence offered by the government in whose territory the event had occurred and the other expedients that it had felt able to use to convince the inquiring party that the event was a natural one, did not succeed in convincing the inquiring party, then the latter would be entitled to withdraw from the agreement. However, withdrawal need not be automatic. Doubts may sometimes be weakened without being fully resolved. Depending on the circumstances of the case, it would of course be a matter for decision by that government whether or not to withdraw from the agreement.

I have elaborated a number of possibilities, not so much for the sake of showing that my delegation is not committed to any particular one -- although that is certainly the case --, as because I believe that if we come to agree that an arrangement such as that has its virtues, we should do well to see that it is quite flexible in its procedure.

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If I might make a suggestion in respect of a difficulty which Mrs. Myrdal herself has recognized, it is that we should avoid the use of the phrase "verification by challenge" because of its rather hostile overtones. I might suggest that "verification by consent" would be a suitable substitute.

My delegation believes that it would be well worth while to pursue and examine those ideas further, in the hope that eventually we may be able to work out a compromise proposal acceptable to all parties. I think we must face one difficulty quite clearly: it is that such a formulation by itself would not provide the same degree of assurance that the treaty was being observed by all parties as would a treaty incorporating the right to even a very small number of on-site inspections. With provision for inspection as of right, refusal to allow an inspection would show up as a guilty party the government which refused. No government would lightly contemplate being put in such a position. However, under formulations of the kind suggested at Scarborough, and of the kind I have outlined this morning, the dialogue which I have been discussing might never even begin if one of the governments concerned refused to co-operate in it.

It seems to my delegation that it would be of considerable help to this Conference if the representative of the Soviet Union would give some indication of the circumstances in which his Government would be prepared to take part in a dialogue of the kind I have outlined this morning. Unless we have some idea of what Soviet policy might be in such circumstances, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to develop these ideas any further.

Before concluding, I should like to remark briefly on another subject. In his speech of 26 July (ENDC/PV.276) the representative of the United States suggested certain modifications to article III of the United States draft non-proliferation treaty (ENDC/152 and Add.1). They were designed to strengthen the safeguard provisions of that treaty. Her Majesty's Government has already shown that it is very ready to co-operate with and assist the International Atomic Energy Agency in its work. We believe that the extension of international safeguards has a vital part to play in the field of non-proliferation. My delegation welcomes that constructive contribution to our consideration of this question. We shall be giving those interesting United States suggestions careful study and shall make our considered comments in due course. I sincerely hope that other Governments represented here will do the same.

(Lord Chalfont, United Kingdom)

Finally, let me say how sorry I am that my recent absence at an international seminar on disarmament in Austria resulted in my missing the meeting on 2 August and the statement at that meeting by the representative of the Soviet Union (ENDC/PV.278). However, I was sorry to see from the verbatim record of his remarks that he chose to bring out yet once more certain familiar charges in connexion with foreign bases. Since many of his remarks were directed at the United Kingdom, I, like the representative of the United States, cannot let it be thought that silence in this case means acquiescence. Nevertheless it does seem to me an occasion on which silence is certainly golden; and therefore I do not propose to weary the Committee on this matter by restating the position of my Government. It is, I am sure, fully familiar to all the members of this Committee.

I think it would be more useful if we were to agree to concentrate our joint attention on those problems whose solution is of real urgency, and especially on those collateral measures which would make a positive contribution to our work.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): Among the proposals for collateral disarmament measures on our agenda, those concerning the halting or freezing of the arms race merit, in the opinion of the Italian delegation, the most thorough attention of this Committee as a matter of priority. It is quite obvious that those are the first steps that must be taken if we wish subsequently to make progress towards reduction in armaments and finally to arrive at their elimination. Other reasons also speak in favour of these measures by showing them as a kind of necessary passage for any progress towards disarmament.

First of all, it must be pointed out that these measures, unlike others which have been proposed, are realistic and specific; they are not the subject of declarations of intention of doubtful value; if they were to be applied, they would lead to concrete and tangible facts, and, moreover, easily verifiable facts. In this respect it should not be forgotten that collateral measures, like any other disarmament measure, must in order to be acceptable correspond to the principles of balanced control. One knows that it is the full correspondence of the various disarmament measures to these two principles that constitutes the crucial problem

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of our negotiations. It will be easier to comply with these principles if the measures taken into consideration are limited and of the preliminary nature which precisely befits measures to halt or freeze the arms race.

Thus it is that by common agreement, in the vast range of possibilities, a clearly-defined sector could be chosen where the halting of this arms race, in accordance with the principles of balance, would not bring any appreciable advantage to either side; since only a limited first step is concerned, the necessary inspections would be limited and discreet.

In the vast range of possibilities I have mentioned, one can envisage three types of measures concerning halting of arms production --

- (1) in a given sector;
- (2) in space;
- (3) in time.

The first category consists of a large number of proposals among which, in the very first place, is the prohibition of underground nuclear weapon tests. That is obviously a qualitative freeze measure which, if it could be agreed upon, would be of the greatest value. In this regard I do not wish to revert to the question -- which has been discussed at length here -- whether inspections are or are not necessary in order to guarantee the faithful fulfilment of a test-ban treaty. This Committee, unfortunately, lacks the jointly and objectively worked-out technical data which are necessary in order to solve this problem, because it has never been able to carry out the studies which would be appropriate and indispensable for this purpose.

But, in regard to the problem of a test ban, my delegation would like to take the liberty of asking the Soviet delegation two questions. First, why did the Soviet delegation withdraw its proposal under which, in order to have assurance of the effective cessation of tests, three inspections a year could be carried out -- a proposal which the Soviet delegation put forward not long ago and is now no longer valid? The fact that the United States delegation reduced its requirements from eight inspections to seven resulted in the number offered by the Soviet delegation being reduced from three to nought, and without any convincing explanation. We were

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simply told that we were wrong not to accept the Soviet proposal straightaway -- in our view not a very convincing explanation.

Secondly, I should like to ask the Soviet delegation if it could not agree -- of course, without any commitment on its part -- to examine with us in a preliminary way the specific methods which such inspections might involve. The Soviet delegation would thus have the opportunity to perceive that these inspections would be in no way prejudicial to the security of the Soviet Union.

Those are two questions in regard to which it would be useful to ascertain the views of the Soviet delegation and to ponder on them.

In regard to the banning of tests, several interesting compromise formulas have been proposed, both during this session and during previous sessions. We are always in favour of compromise formulas if they are valid and guaranteed. It is for this reason that I believe that, where tests are concerned, one should put aside the formulas which do not meet these requirements or which would represent too fragile compromises, which inevitably would not stand up for long to the test of facts.

In continuing the examination of the list of contemplated measures, we see that the measure which follows in logical order the banning of tests is the halting of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes (ENDC/120). My delegation has given and continues to give full support to this proposal because it has four particular advantages: cutting off the development of nuclear weapons at its very base; being easily verifiable by machinery which already exists and is in part already tested and applied; agreeing on well-balanced sacrifices; and, lastly, facilitating the conclusion of an agreement on non-dissemination.

Furthermore, the application of this measure would make it possible to transfer the military fissile material that becomes available to peaceful and technical-assistance purposes. Thus this measure would have not only a political and practical value, but also a great social and moral significance.

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Still within the field of halting the nuclear arms race, there is the proposal to freeze the production of strategic nuclear vehicles (ibid.) This is a measure of considerable scope which, if it were decided upon, would represent a step forward of exceptional importance for general and complete disarmament. As we know, this proposal is a United States one; but we must not forget that the Soviet delegation has put forward in the Gromyko plan (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1) the idea of a drastic reduction of all strategic nuclear vehicles.

The two proposals which affect the most lethal weapons have, in the opinion of my delegation, a close link. Obviously the Gromyko plan would be meaningless if it were not preceded by a total freeze, both of the production and of the characteristics of these devices; thus the United States proposal is a kind of prerequisite of the Gromyko plan. If one began to explore in earnest the proposal to freeze strategic nuclear vehicles, the Gromyko proposal would greatly benefit. Indeed, that should perhaps be the first task to be carried out by the working group in order to prepare for the examination of the Gromyko plan.

It should also be borne in mind, as the representative of the United States, Mr Fisher, pointed out at our last meeting, that an earliest possible agreement on this freeze measure would have a favourable effect even on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. In fact, such an agreement could come in time to prevent a continuation of the arms race, in a sector where what the experts have called a new generation of nuclear devices can be expected. The same observation was made by the representative of Brazil, Mr. Azeredo da Silveira, on 26 July, when he referred to new defence systems. The setting up of those systems, he said, would necessitate the carrying out of an extensive series of underground tests (ENDC/PV.276, p.16).

The proposals I have mentioned are certainly not the only ones that could be envisaged with a view to freezing some sectors of armaments production. Others could be easily imagined. I will mention the ideas put forward by the Western delegations; but we have often asked that other ideas of the same kind should be suggested by the Soviet delegation regarding any sector of its choice in the field of

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armaments production where a freeze could be carried out. We still await those proposals, and are ready to examine them with an open mind and good will.

The Eastern delegations have so far made proposals for a territorial freeze. To be precise, I am referring to the proposals of the Polish delegation supported by the other Eastern delegations -- the Gomulka plan and the revised Gomulka plan (ENDC/PV.189, p.6), the latter being hitherto the subject of bilateral talks only. The Italian Government has examined the Gomulka plan, but believes that a plan for a territorial freeze of armaments production would be acceptable only if the strategic importance of the territories were more or less the same on both sides. That is not the case with the Gomulka plan, and that makes its acceptance difficult. If those plans are, as they seem to be, supported by the Soviet Union, it should co-operate to make their acceptance possible. The Soviet Union will realize that only an extension to the east of the territories covered by the plan would give the Polish suggestions a concrete character and serious chances of success.

In regard to the territorial freeze, the plans for the denuclearization of Latin America and the continent of Africa have engaged our most favourable attention. We have followed with a very friendly feeling the efforts that have been made in that field by the countries of Latin America, and I should like to congratulate the two distinguished representatives of that continent in the Committee on the progress which has been achieved. On the Italian side, of course, we should regard very favourably the acceptance of the amendment to the draft treaty on non-proliferation which the representative of Mexico has suggested in order to facilitate the denuclearization of Latin America (ENDC/PV.274, pp.15, 16). If, as we hope, we set about the work of drafting the non-proliferation treaty, I am confident that this Committee will take into consideration the Mexican request, which moreover fully corresponds to the meaning and the letter of United Nations resolution 2028 (XX) (ENDC/161).

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Lastly, in a general examination of possible freeze measures one must not overlook proposals which by their nature and purpose would lead to a temporary freeze. In this connexion it is necessary to distinguish clearly between a controlled and an uncontrolled moratorium. The latter category, of course, does not involve any guarantee; and past experience shows that a moratorium of that type is valueless and makes no contribution to mutual security. Appropriate control is an essential element of any disarmament measure, whether temporary or otherwise. That is why a mere moratorium on underground tests is not acceptable.

The situation is quite different if the moratorium is controlled, and it was the need for the existence of control that inspired the proposal for a nuclear moratorium submitted last year by the Italian delegation (ENDC/157). In regard to that proposal it must be pointed out that the Committee is still seeking an overall and final solution to the problem of non-proliferation, such as could be obtained through the conclusion of a general treaty. The Italian delegation has participated in the efforts made with a view to the drafting of such a treaty, by making specific and realistic proposals in order that practical and thorough work on the drafting of a treaty could be started.

We shall refer to the possibility of a subsidiary solution such as a moratorium when the time comes, not wishing at this stage to bring into the discussion on collateral measures a measure which, while certainly very useful, would overlap the comparative examination of the two draft treaties which is still going on.

I have made this rapid survey of the freeze measures which could be envisaged in the different fields, in order to bring about progress in the elaboration of collateral measures. There is a vast range of possibilities which should be explored. It represents an ample agenda for the work of the Committee, for the present and for the future. We have often suggested here, but so far without result, that in carrying out our task we should adopt the normal method of all negotiations -- the method of working groups. I venture to repeat that, if we wish to make our work effective, it would be appropriate to set up a study group for each of these subjects so that the Conference can examine them all in parallel without wasting time.

I refuse to believe that, if such work were undertaken, some concrete results could not soon be achieved in one field or another. It has always been our desire to explore all ways; we have noted once again that these ways are numerous. It is for us to explore them without neglecting a single one, with patience and

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determination, through constructive methods and appropriate procedures, so that the right way can be found at last and followed right through.

Mr. DUMITRESCU (Romania) (translation from French): We have listened with great attention and interest to the statement of the Swedish representative, Mrs. Myrdal, whom I should like to welcome on her return to our midst and who has made a further contribution to our work. We have also listened with interest to the statements of the representatives of the United Kingdom and Italy. The Romanian delegation will study those statements with all due attention and will not fail to express its views on them.

Before taking up the subject of my statement today, I should like to thank the representative of Italy, Mr. Cavalletti, for his kindness in taking the floor before me.

At this stage of our negotiations I think it would be useful to make a few comments of principle regarding the whole of the collateral measures on the agenda of our Committee, as I wish to contribute towards clarifying the causes which have led to the clearly unsatisfactory situation in which we find ourselves.

What is really the matter? Let us make a brief review. During the four years and more which have elapsed since the beginning of our negotiations, more than twenty collateral measures have been placed on the agenda of the Conference. Many of them have been proposed during the three years that have elapsed since the signing of the Moscow Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1), which should have been followed by other measures designed to eliminate the danger of a nuclear war, reduce international tension and create a climate favourable to the establishment of real international security, to which, in a world consisting of sovereign and independent States, all countries are equally entitled.

Even a very summary examination shows that many of the proposals put before the Committee were designed to obtain certain unilateral advantages to the detriment of the vast majority of States, including the socialist countries. Their adoption would therefore entail, not the implementation of the basic principles of international law -- including the United Nations Charter -- by virtue of which, after all, we are meeting here, but quite the contrary: the disregard of those principles, the violation of the sovereignty and national independence of States, and the repudiation of the equal right of States to security. A good many of those proposals are based on the concept of maintaining a so-called "balance of terror",

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thus subordinating the basic principles on which we insist to strategic considerations which have nothing to do with the aims of disarmament. It was natural that such proposals should meet with scant support in the Committee.

But our Conference has also before it a number of feasible and realistic proposals calculated to improve the general climate by slowing down the arms race and reducing the nuclear danger. In the first place, there is the proposal to ban the use of nuclear weapons and of all weapons of mass destruction in general (ENDC/167), a measure the urgency of which has been stressed by many delegations. In supporting this proposal once again the Romanian delegation considers that it would be useful to make a few observations. The first is that we have a precedent in this regard; the second is that all the arguments put forward against the banning of weapons of mass destruction have already been rejected.

The General Assembly resolution prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons (A/RES/2028 (XX); ENDC/161) was adopted as in accordance with the great principles of contemporary international law, and as calculated to promote the sovereignty and national independence of States, both of which are gravely endangered by the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons or of a resort to nuclear blackmail. It meets the need to ensure that the equal right to security for all States without exception is respected, a fact which does not need to be proved where the non-nuclear Powers are concerned but which applies equally to the nuclear Powers, whose security has never been more precarious than it is now that they have "over-kill capacity".

The measure to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons will assume concrete form through the actual conclusion of the corresponding international treaty, without need for any complementary action, instrument or step. Nor does the problem of control arise, which, as is known, entails special difficulties in regard to the implementation of other measures connected with nuclear disarmament and with disarmament in general. Basically, the use of nuclear weapons is incompatible both with the laws of peace and with the laws of war, which lay down a very clear distinction between combatants and the civilian population, provide for limiting the effects of military operations to the theatre of war, and are designed to preserve neutral States from the destruction and suffering which accompany war. If this holds good for any weapon of mass destruction, it applies a fortiori to nuclear weapons, the effects of which not only threaten the living but also gravely endanger the health and the very existence of future generations.

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The Protocol on the prohibition of the use of chemical, poisonous and bacteriological weapons, adopted at Geneva on 17 June 1925, provides in this respect not only a legal basis but also a precedent. It constitutes, in the first place, the proof that such a prohibition, although it does not provide a hundred per cent guarantee against the risk that the weapons will be used, does have extremely useful effects. No one, to our knowledge, has maintained that the Protocol concluded at Geneva on 17 June 1925 was useless.

Secondly, this precedent is instructive because it shows that as long ago as 1925 all the arguments were rejected which are now put forward against the proposal to conclude an international treaty proclaiming the illicit character of the use of nuclear weapons, and of all weapons of mass destruction in general. Those arguments were also rejected, among others, by the predecessors of the representatives of the very States whose opposition has so far prevented the conclusion of such a treaty.

In this regard the honourable representative of the United States -- honour to whom honour is due -- Mr. Theodore E. Burton, said -- and I quote from the League of Nations publication entitled Proceedings of the Conference for the Supervision of the International Trade in Arms (Geneva, 4 May - 17 June 1925, document A.13. 1925, IX, p. 309):

"There has been absolute unanimity that the use of asphyxiating gases in warfare is barbarous and should be condemned by every civilized nation."

I shall pause here for a moment to ask what Mr. Burton would have called the use of weapons a thousand times more barbarous than asphyxiating gases.

Referring to the report of the Military Technical Committee of the Conference, which proposed a document in which an opinion would be expressed in favour of the drafting of a universal convention banning chemical and bacteriological warfare, Mr. Burton said (ibid., p. 310):

"We hope that it may be possible to take even more prompt and effective measures than those proposed in the excellent suggestion made in the recommendation of the Technical Committee or by those who have spoken here today.

...I would like therefore to recommend that we take this occasion ... to prepare here and now a resolution based on Article 5 of the Washington Treaty of February 6th, 1922, with a view to its immediate signature by the delegations which may be prepared to do so and which could be open for signature for a reasonable time by other States whether represented here or not."

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Then, recalling that the problem had already been dealt with in Washington in 1921 and 1922, Mr. Burton said:

"... a convention was concluded which was signed by the United States, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan -- five Powers" (ibid.).

With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I should now like to read out Article V of the Washington Convention, which, incidentally, is due to an initiative of the United States. On the proposal of the United States representative, that article was transferred to the international treaty of Geneva, which bears the modest denomination of Protocol. But that has not prevented it from being a document embodying a progressive principle of modern international law, a principle which is universally recognized today and is equally obligatory for all States. Here is the text of Article V:

"The use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all analogous liquids, materials or devices, having been justly condemned by the general opinion of the civilized world "--- allow me to repeat, 'condemned by the general opinion' --" and a prohibition of such use having been declared in treaties to which a majority of the civilized Powers are parties,

"The signatory Powers, to the end that this prohibition shall be universally accepted as a part of international law, binding alike the conscience and the practice of nations, declare their assent to such prohibition, agree to be bound thereby as between themselves and invite all other civilized nations to adhere thereto" (Treaties, &c., between the United States and other Powers, 1910 -- 1923 ; vol. III, p. 3118)

That invitation is addressed to all of us here, over the decades.

No more in 1925 than in 1922 was the fact denied that a treaty banning the use of such weapons made more explicit the incidence of certain general principles of international law according to which there are some illicit and prohibited weapons, and that such weapons are in the first place the blind weapons, the weapons of mass destruction.

Even at that time many objections were put forward which we are still hearing today when the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons is discussed. In 1925 it was said in Geneva: "You cannot humanize a tiger, you can only kill it" (Proceedings of the Conference &c., p. 313). It was also said: "Why have the legal systems of the various countries never considered the possibility of regulating

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murder?" (ibid., p. 212). In other words, anticipating the arguments now being used by certain Western delegations, it was said that international law prohibits aggression and that it is the aggression that constitutes the crime, not the use of a particular weapon against the aggressor.

We know that, besides the crime of waging a criminal war, there are also war crimes, one of them being precisely the use of prohibited weapons.

I have recalled these arguments in order to prove that, even as far back as 1925, various States rejected them and that among those States were some Western Powers which are participating in the work of our Committee.

Another idea, which was at the basis of the adoption of the Geneva Protocol, is equally worth mentioning: the idea of the need to avoid inequality in respect of security. Pointing out that every major industrial Power has at its disposal the necessary raw materials for the manufacture of chemical weapons, and that it could very easily use its potential for the production of prohibited chemical weapons, the representative of Italy, General de Marinis, said:

"This facility, indeed, gives a country with flourishing chemical industries an immense superiority if that country harbours hostile designs" (ibid., p. 308).

What solutions were envisaged? A first solution, recommended by the Technical Committee, was prohibition of the transfer of chemical products. But General de Marinis, whom I have already quoted, said:

"... The ... Committee ... had to recognize that the prohibition of trade in chemical products is not practicable in the majority of cases and that, even if it could be effected, it would prove of no avail against Powers possessing a highly developed chemical industry."

And he added:

".... such a prohibition would place non-producing countries in a dangerous position of inferiority as against producing countries. Your Committee was unanimous" -- I repeat, 'unanimous' -- "in thinking that this illusory method should be rejected and that the radical solution of the terrible problem would be found in a solemn and universal undertaking on the part of all the peoples of the world to regard chemical warfare as prohibited by the law of nations. That amounts in substance to asking the States of the whole world to accede to Article V of the Treaty concluded at Washington on February 6th, 1922" (ibid., pp. 308, 309).

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The representative of Japan, Mr. Matsuda, said on that occasion:

"... unless the use of asphyxiating gases as a military device is first condemned, it will not be possible effectively to prohibit exportation" (ibid.).

I apologize if I have abused the patience of this Committee by quoting lengthy extracts from the records of a conference which took place here several decades ago. However, in doing so perhaps we have not wasted our time. If we replace the term "chemical weapon" by the term "nuclear weapon", if instead of chemical substances or bodies we talk of nuclear energy, we find ourselves faced with all the arguments with which we are familiar in the discussions concerning the convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons.

The Protocol was signed on 17 June 1925. It was not ratified, it is true, by all States. Nevertheless, it is generally recognized today that the use of chemical, bacteriological and other weapons banned by the Geneva Protocol is prohibited and constitutes a war crime.

An examination of the problems relating to the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons would be incomplete if we did not keep in mind also the recent measures and the proposals aimed at partial prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, foreshadowing -- so to speak -- the situation in the event of this prohibition being established on a world-wide scale. References have also been made here, for instance, at the previous meeting by the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Roshchin (ENDC/PV.278, p. 15), to the Convention on the Antarctic and to the General Assembly resolution prohibiting the placing in orbit of any objects carrying nuclear weapons (A/RES/1884 (XVIII); ENDC/117). I would also refer to the current negotiations regarding the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons on celestial bodies (A/AC/105).

Basically, all this, and the proposals relating to the establishment of denuclearized zones in various regions of the world, accompanied by the commitment of the nuclear Powers never to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear Powers, have confirmed the illegality of these weapons, since the prohibition of their use has been proclaimed in the respective spheres. In the final analysis, there is no reason which militated in favour of the adoption of the Protocol which does not militate today -- and with even greater force -- in favour of the adoption of a convention which would solemnly confirm the outlawing of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons.

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Of course, the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons can also be inserted in treaties which have other objectives. Any treaty providing for a measure of nuclear disarmament or designed to promote the freeing of mankind from the nightmare of a nuclear war should, however, have in view the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, or at least the commitment of the nuclear Powers not to be the first to use them.

The more than disquieting development of the international situation testifies that the adoption of a solemn agreement prohibiting the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons would constitute a positive if not a decisive element for the progress of our negotiations, in the interest of general peace and security.

I should now like to refer to other collateral measures on our agenda to the solution of which the Declarations recently adopted at Bucharest by the signatory countries of the Warsaw Treaty have made an important contribution.

One of these Declarations, as is well known, is devoted to the problem of European security. In the opinion of the Romanian Government, this is one of the most important problems in the political life of our continent, a problem which, because of its consequences, affects the entire international situation, directly interests all European countries, and is of concern to the peoples of the whole world. The peoples of our continent who had to endure the immense sacrifices demanded by the struggle to defeat the fascist aggressors in the Second World War are profoundly interested in preventing the outbreak of a new war and in establishing a lasting peace.

In this connexion we should not forget that even today, more than twenty years after the establishment of peace, the sequelae of the Second World War have not yet been eliminated, that no peace treaty has been concluded with Germany, that important controversial problems are still pending, and that sources of tension and dangers to the peace of the peoples still exist.

Based on an analysis of the present situation in Europe, the Bucharest Declaration rightly stresses that in Europe the trend in favour of eliminating the sequelae of the cold war is becoming ever stronger, thus making for the removal of the obstacles standing in the way of general European co-operation, for the normalization of international life and rapprochement among the peoples.

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As was stated quite recently by Nicolae Ceausescu, Secretary-General of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party, it is now possible to tackle the security problem in a new way, on a basis acceptable to all European States (ENDC/PV.270, p. 25). To ensure European security is a complex problem which calls for sustained efforts; this presumes an evolutionary process that can ensure the progressive elimination of sources of tension and friction among States and of mistrust among the peoples, and dissipate the atmosphere of the fear of war and aggression.

That is what gives the utmost importance to the initiative of the signatory countries of the Bucharest Declaration, which consists in discussing the problem of European security and presenting a broad programme of measures designed to achieve this objective. The signatory countries of the Declaration express themselves in favour of the extension of multilateral co-operation among all countries, the exchange of goods, co-operation in bringing about technical-scientific and cultural-artistic exchanges, while stressing the need for non-discrimination among States having differing social systems. It is necessary to take as a starting-point the historical realities which made their appearance as a result of the Second World War, in particular the existence of two German States. This would entail, for the two German States, the prospect of making their contributions to the safeguarding of European peace and security.

An important condition for the improvement of the relations between countries, and consequently for the promotion of European security, is respect for the frontiers established after the Second World War, and the assurance of the territorial inviolability of all European States. The objective analysis of the situation in Europe made at the Bucharest meeting has shown the need for the abolition of military blocs which no longer correspond to the present international conditions. A radical step towards reducing military tension in Europe would be the abolition of

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the North Atlantic Treaty Organization at the same time as that of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. The socialist countries which met in Bucharest have, for their part, solemnly reaffirmed in the aforementioned Declaration that they are prepared to approve the simultaneous abolition of the two organizations.

As we have declared on several occasions, we have the profound conviction that the true guarantee of the international security of all countries consists not in the policy of blocs but in the elimination of the sources of tension between States, of the causes which could give rise to armed conflicts, and in the development between States of confidence and co-operation based on the fundamental principles of international law, respect for national sovereignty and independence, equality of rights, non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, and mutual advantage.

Striving for the abolition of military blocs, the signatory countries of the Declaration at the same time expressed their resolve to make continued efforts for the adoption of collateral measures of disarmament, and to facilitate the establishment of European security and the consolidation of international peace and security. One of these measures would be the withdrawal of United States and other non-European troops from our continent, the withdrawal of all foreign troops to within their own national borders. The liquidation of foreign military bases would also exercise a positive influence on the international situation. The prohibition of access to nuclear weapons in any form whatsoever by the militarist forces of the Federal Republic of Germany is of importance for European security.

Before concluding I should like to stress once again the particular importance which the Romanian Government attaches to the principles proclaimed in resolution 2129 (XX) of the United Nations General Assembly concerning the development of good-neighbourly relations between countries

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having different social systems. Romania is making continuous and special efforts to develop such relations between the countries of the Balkans and the Adriatic and to transform this region into a zone of peace free of nuclear weapons. As the Prime Minister of Romania, Mr. Ion Gheorghe Maurer, said during his recent visit to Turkey:

"To develop good-neighbourly relations and friendship between the Balkan countries is to make an important contribution to the cause of peace and international co-operation in the Balkan region and, on a higher plane, on the European and world scale."

At Bucharest there was also adopted a Declaration concerning the United States aggression in Viet-Nam which, besides condemning this aggression, expressed the complete solidarity of the signatory countries with the just struggle of the Viet-Nameese people. The signatory States of the Warsaw Treaty, addressing themselves to the governments of all countries, requested them to do everything they could to put an end to United States aggression in Viet-Nam, to liquidate the centre of war in South-East Asia, and to bring about a reduction of tension and the return of international relations to normal. No State, no government concerned with the fate of peace can or should treat with indifference the acts of the United States of America in Viet-Nam. These acts not only threaten the independence and freedom of the Viet-Nameese people but also create an ever more serious danger to world peace. I believe that the overwhelming majority of governments have reached the same conclusion.

The ending of armed aggression by the United States in Viet-Nam -- where the bombardment of the demilitarized zone has now increased still further the danger to world peace -- and the withdrawal of all foreign military forces from South Viet-Nam are imperious necessities, and would undoubtedly at the same time restore the climate necessary for any progress in the disarmament negotiations.

Mr. FISHER (United States of America) : I have listened with interest to the previous speeches of the distinguished representatives of Sweden, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Romania. A number of interesting points were raised to which I would like to refer later. I listened with particular interest to the statement of the distinguished representative of Sweden and noted that there were technical questions which were put to the United States. As I understood them these were quantitative questions: that is, the answers would require figures regarding the epicentre and problems of regional bias. These deserve replies with technical answers, and I would hope to supply them at the proper time.

I also listened with interest to the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom, and noted his mention of suggestions put forward in the report of the International Assembly on Nuclear Weapons held at Scarborough, Toronto, from 23 to 26 June. I should like to say a few words regarding the United States Government's attitude toward the suggestions put forward in the Assembly's report.

The Scarborough meeting, as our distinguished colleague pointed out, was a privately-sponsored one; United States Government officials who were present attended purely in a private capacity. The report of the discussions of the working groups at the Scarborough conference was a fair presentation of the subjects discussed; but the participants did not sign the report as representing their individual views. In this connexion I call your attention to the caveat cited at the beginning of the Scarborough final report, which states in part: "No one signed it and it should not be assumed that every participant necessarily subscribed to every statement".

Among the many informal, unofficial suggestions made at Scarborough was one for a suspension of underground nuclear testing for a limited trial period, with a system of verification of seismologically-ambiguous events by challenge or invitation. Our study of this suggestion has only just begun and I cannot now usefully predict its outcome. What is to be explored is whether the concept of a trial period of verification by invitation or challenge might be a useful component of an agreement to suspend all testing. During this trial period, presumably, procedures would be tested to determine if they would be satisfactory for a test-ban treaty of indefinite duration.

This Scarborough suggestion combines the challenge idea with that of an experimental suspension of tests. Now my Government's strong opposition to any unverified moratorium on underground nuclear testing is well known. On 4 April I also set forth

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before this Committee some of the serious reservations we have regarding a challenge procedure as part of a permanent test-ban treaty (ENDC/PV.254, pp.19 et seq). As I indicated then, the number of events that would remain unidentified after analysis of the seismic data could lead to a considerable number of challenges being made. Since such challenges might be considered by some to be merely accusations, they might be met by the simple assertion that the challenges had no basis. If so, the procedure would not only fail in its purpose but might instead become a source of dissension -- unless, of course, the procedure included some method for resolving differences. In our view, differences over means of verification should be settled before the conclusion of a treaty to cease testing, and not on the occasion of the first challenge. Otherwise the treaty might be short-lived indeed.

These are some of the considerations which challenge must inevitably bring to mind. Whether a trial of this procedure in the context of an agreement of limited duration could prove useful is of course an interesting question for study, and we intend to pursue this study. But we must look carefully at this unofficial suggestion from the Scarborough conference, as well as at other alternatives, not as a means of achieving a suspension of underground nuclear tests at any cost but rather to assess whether it could facilitate progress toward a stable and lasting agreement.

These are some preliminary views. In the meantime we will listen with interest to the views of others regarding this Scarborough suggestion, as we have listened with interest to those put forward today. It would help our study of this matter if we could have a better understanding as to what the challenge procedure is believed to involve. Would it in fact include the means for resolving differences should the process of challenge and response lead to a dispute? Would there be an obligation for the party against which the challenge is made to provide particular kinds of evidence in defence of its response?

We would welcome in particular hearing the views of the Soviet Union, and notably whether the Soviet Union would be prepared to co-operate in a system of verification by challenge or invitation which, should other evidence fail to resolve the ambiguity surrounding a suspicious event, would provide an opportunity to visit the site to determine whether a violation had actually occurred.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 279th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador V.C. Trivedi, representative of India.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Sweden, the United Kingdom, Italy, Romania and the United States.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 9 August 1966, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.40 p.m.